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principles or possible local prejudice, would be eager to invoke section 1979 and thereby gain access to the federal courts.
In essence, the decision brings the heretofore hazy concepts of
federal civil rights closer to the everyday interests of the common
litigant. It is suggested that the York decision will prompt an increased use of these concepts via section 1979.
JOHN

R.

BERANEK

CRIMINAL LAW: INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COURT
CONCERNING THE PAROLE LAWS IN A CAPITAL
OFFENSE PROSECUTION
Burnette v. State, 157 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1963)
During its deliberations in a murder prosecution, the jury returned to the courtroom and requested information about the possibility of parole if it returned a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of mercy thereby invoking the automatic penalty of life imprisonment.' The court responded by instructing the jury that "Under
the laws of the State of Florida, a person imprisoned becomes eligible
to submit an application after having been in prison for a period of
six months. And the application is acted upon by a parole commission .... ." The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in
the first degree, and the court sentenced the defendant to death. On
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, HELD, that the trial court's
instruction on the substantive law of parole was error. The court
26. See Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657, 660 (N.D. Idaho 1962); Note, 36
IND. L.J. 317, 321 (1961).
1. FLA. STAT. §919.23 (2) (1963) provides in part: "Whoever is convicted of a
capital offense and recommended to the mercy of the court by a majority of the
jury in their verdict, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life .. "
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suggested that the jury should be instructed, as a part of the general
charge, that the provisions for parole or pardon are a part of the laws
of the state and are administered by public officials and that the jury
should not discuss these procedures in arriving at its verdict or in
considering a recommendation of mercy. 2 Reversed and remanded
for a new trial.
There is no general agreement in other jurisdictions whether
parole is a proper subject on which to instruct the jury.3 Some courts
have adopted the rule that the jury should not consider the matter
and should be instructed to this effect upon inquiry.4 The reasoning
of these courts is that the possibility of parole is neither a relevant
nor proper factor for the jury to consider in arriving at its verdict.
Thus, the jury is instructed that the power to parole is vested in a
coordinate branch of the government and that it should decide
guilt or innocence without recourse to conjecture as to the probable
action of the parole authority. One court has expressed the view
that the trial judge should instruct the jury, after inquiry, on the
substantive law of parole, but should also charge that this matter
should not be considered in the deliberations. 5 The basis for this
view is that once the jury indicates that parole could be a factor in
its deliberation, it is the duty of the court to read the relevant statutes
on parole to the jury in order to remove any popular misconceptions
that passage of time alone entitles a prisoner to parole. Other jurisdictions allow an instruction to the jury, after inquiry, as to the parole
laws without further restriction or qualification.6 This is premised
on the theory that in a capital case, where a recommendation of mercy
automatically reduces the penalty, the jury has the dual function of
determining the punishment as well as the guilt or innocence of the
accused. These jurisdictions conclude that the jury should have full
knowledge of the parole procedures in order to perform its duties
fairly and accurately and to prevent any misconceptions of the law.
Until recently, California represented a unique minority position in
holding that the judge in a capital case should instruct the jury on
2. Although the court strongly advised the giving of this charge, it clearly
stated that failure to give such would not alone constitute reversible error.
3.

See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.

REv. 1099, 1124-25 (1953); Comment, 10 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 219 (1953).
4. McCray v. State, 261 Ala. 275, 74 So. 2d 491 (1954); State v. Lammers, 171
Kan. 668, 237 P.2d 410 (1951); State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d 584 (1955);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693 (1952).
5. State v. Maxey, 42 N.J. 60, 198 A.2d 768 (1964); State v. White, 27 N.J. 158,
142 A.2d 65 (1958).
6. Glover v. State, 211 Ark. 1002, 204 S.W.2d 373 (1947); State v. Nelson, 65
N.M. 403, 338 P.2d 301 (1959); State v. Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249, 95 N.E.2d 385
(1950).
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the subject matter of parole before an inquiry is made by the jury.
The reasoning of the California courts was that since the jury fixes
the penalty in a capital case by granting or withholding a recommendation of mercy, it should be given all relevant facts, "to assist it
in assessing the significance of a life sentence." 7 In 1964, however,
the California Supreme Court in People v. Morses conducted an excellent analysis of its position and concluded that the practice of
instructing the jury on the substantive law of parole resulted in
prejudice to the accused. The court in overruling its previous decisions adopted a position similar to that in Burnette.
The Burnette case is a culmination of several Florida cases presenting the question, whether, upon inquiry, the court should instruct
the jury as to the parole laws. In McKee v. State,9 a capital offense
prosecution, when the jury inquired as to the parole laws and the
trial court read to the jurors the statute relating to parole,O the
Florida Supreme Court held that no error was committed in that the
verdict of guilty carried with it a recommendation of mercy. However,
in the later case of Phillips v. State,1 when the trial court had informed the jury of the possibility of parole if there was a verdict of
guilty with a recommendation of mercy, the supreme court found no
error even though the jury had returned a verdict of guilty without
a recommendation of mercy. The court merely indicated, without
further explanation, that "if the charge had any effect whatever it was
to the advantage of the appellant and harmless.-12 The reasoning of
the court seemed to be that it was the duty of the trial court to charge
on the possible penalty, as well as the law, and that the parole laws
are a part of the penalties fixed by law. The Phillips case was overruled by the instant case to the extent that the court concluded that
a trial judge should not instruct the jury on the parole laws, but
should charge that parole laws do exist in the state but are not to be
considered by the jury in their deliberations.
The holding in Burnette is sound in that the court concludes that
a jury should be instructed not to consider parole in its deliberation.
Assuming that the jury will respect an admonishment of this nature,
such should prevent parole from becoming a factor in the jury's decision to the prejudice of the accused. Presumably the jury will decide
guilt or innocence in an impartial atmosphere without allowing
parole to affect its decision whether to recommend mercy if the
7. People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d 871, 885, 346 P.2d 22, 30 (1959); accord, People v.
Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d 503, 381 P.2d 394 (1963).
8. 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33 (1964).
9. 159 Fla. 794, 33 So. 2d 50 (1947).
10. FLA. STAT. §947.16 (1963).
11. 92 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1957).
12. Id. at 628.
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verdict is guilty. In the principal case, the trial court's instruction
that a prisoner is eligible for parole after serving six months in prison
might have presented a misleading picture. Most felons convicted of
capital offenses are not placed on parole for several years even though
by statute' 3 they are eligible for parole after six months of imprisonment. It would be impossible for a court to guarantee that the accused will not be released for a substantial period of time because
each potential parolee is considered individually by the parole commission. 14 The jury, in a capital case, can only foreclose a possibility
of parole by refusing to recommend mercy thereby invoking the
mandatory death penalty. The alternative of recommending mercy
but denying defendant any possibility of parole is not within the power
of the jury. To permit such practice would, in effect, be abolishing
a function of the Parole Commission whose power is derived from the
legislature. 15 Thus the suggested instruction in Burnette is sound in
that it forbids the jury to speculate upon future actions of the Parole
Commission.-6
In rejecting the trial court's instruction on the substantive law of
parole, the court in Burnette cited its decision in Pait v. State17 where
the jury returned to the courtroom and inquired about the possibility
of parole. The judge refused to answer the question and instructed
the jurors that they would have to confine their deliberations to the
evidence presented at trial. Although approving the trial judge's
answer in Pait, the court in Burnette was not satisfied that an appropriate answer upon inquiry afforded an adequate solution to the
problem of preventing an injustice resulting from jury consideration
of parole. Thus the court concluded that it would be better practice
for the trial judge to instruct the jury as a part of the general charge,
before any inquiry is made, that parole laws do exist, but are administered by a separate governmental agency and are not to be considered by the jury.
The court's conclusion is subject to considerable controversy.
Whether it is best to await inquiry or to raise the issue in the general
13. FLA. STAT. §947.16 (1963).
14. FLA. STAT. §§947.16, .17, .18 (1963). See Clark, Parole in Florida, 11 U.
FLA. L. R.v. 68, 74-82 (1958).
15. FLA. STAT. §947.13 (1963).
16. In People v. Morse the California Supreme Court expressly stated: "The
objective situation is difficult enough without blurring the functions. The function
of the jury is to consider the facts surrounding the crime and defendant's background, and upon that basis, reach its decision. The jury should not be invited
to decide if the defendant will be fit for release in the future; it should not at all
be involved in the issue of the time, if any, when the defendant should be released; it should not be propelled into weighing the possible consequences of the
Authority's administrative action." 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 208, 388 P.2d 33, 40 (1964).
17. 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
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charge in the hope of preventing jury consideration without the
knowledge of the court is a question that is difficult to resolve. On one
hand it may be argued that if the subject of parole is mentioned in the
general charge, the jury could construe this as an implied warning
that the defendant might be discharged after serving a minimum
sentence. In any event the jury's attention would be directed to the
subject. The argument of "implied warning" is refuted if one assumes
that the jury will, in good faith, follow the court's admonishment not
to consider the matter in deliberation. Moreover, this argument assumes that the jury or an individual juror does not consider parole in
the absence of judicial instruction. But the number of cases in which
the issue is raised upon inquiry should itself indicate the disturbing
possibility of the number of times that a jury has acted on its own
information.-8 Thus it would appear that the court's suggestion for
instruction as a part of the general charge eliminates the risk of such
"unknown" action by the jury.
It is submitted that the holding in Burnett and the subsequent
decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Morse represent
the better view.' Both Florida and California, in distinguishing the
functions of the court, the jury, and the parole commission, have
moved to the forefront of a continuing effort to protect the rights of
one accused of a capital crime.
HUME F.

18.
19.

COLEMAN

See 35 A.L.R.2d 769, 771 n.10.
But cf. 7 U. MIAMI L.Q. 120 (1952).
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